

# TOPOLOGICAL FRUSTRATION AND RESIDUAL COST: EXACT LOCAL MINIMIZERS FOR RECIPROCAL BOND GEOMETRY

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ABSTRACT. Let  $J(x) = \frac{1}{2}(x + x^{-1}) - 1$  for  $x > 0$ . For fixed positive neighbor data  $n_1, \dots, n_d$ , we study the local bond cost  $\mathcal{C}(v) = \sum_{i=1}^d J(v/n_i)$ . We prove an exact closed form for the unique minimizer:

$$v^* = \sqrt{\frac{\sum_i n_i}{\sum_i n_i^{-1}}} =: \mathfrak{M}(n_1, \dots, n_d),$$

and an exact minimal residual  $\min_{v>0} \mathcal{C}(v) = \sqrt{(\sum_i n_i)(\sum_i n_i^{-1})} - d$ . This residual is strictly positive unless all neighbors are equal (by Cauchy–Schwarz). For two incompatible neighbors  $n_1 \neq n_2$ , we obtain the explicit frustration formula  $\min_{v>0} (J(v/n_1) + J(v/n_2)) = \sqrt{n_1/n_2} + \sqrt{n_2/n_1} - 2 > 0$ . At graph level, if local neighborhoods produce different  $J$ -means at two vertices, then any simultaneous local minimizer field is necessarily non-uniform. We call this forced non-uniformity *topological frustration* and prove it in the precise form: the optimizing field at each node is uniquely determined by its neighborhood (strict convexity), so distinct neighborhoods force distinct node values. We record application-interface statements for fluid-direction smoothing, constraint relaxation, and lattice embedding.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

The reciprocal cost  $J(x) = \frac{1}{2}(x + x^{-1}) - 1$  is nonnegative, reciprocal-symmetric ( $J(x) = J(1/x)$ ), and strictly convex on  $(0, \infty)$ . These one-variable facts are developed in detail in the companion paper [?], where it is shown that  $J$  is the unique such function satisfying the d’Alembert functional identity with unit curvature.

This paper addresses the *multi-bond local problem*: given fixed bond neighbor values  $n_1, \dots, n_d > 0$ , what value  $v > 0$  minimizes  $\sum_{i=1}^d J(v/n_i)$ ? The answer is an explicit closed form. This immediately yields precise frustration inequalities: when neighbors disagree, the residual cost is provably positive, with an exact formula.

The paper is organized as follows. Section ?? derives the closed form and the  $J$ -mean. Section ?? proves the strict frustration inequalities with explicit lower bounds. Section ?? lifts the local result to a graph-level non-collapse theorem. Section ?? records application interfaces used by companion papers.

## 2. LOCAL OPTIMIZATION AGAINST FIXED NEIGHBORS

**Definition 2.1** (Local bond cost). For fixed  $n_1, \dots, n_d > 0$  ( $d \geq 1$ ), define

$$\mathcal{C}(v) := \sum_{i=1}^d J(v/n_i), \quad v > 0.$$

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*Date:* February 2026.

*2020 Mathematics Subject Classification.* Primary 26A51; Secondary 05C69, 49J40, 26D15.

*Key words and phrases.* Reciprocal cost, strict frustration, local minimizer, harmonic-arithmetic mean, non-collapse, graph optimization.

**Lemma 2.2** (Closed form). *With  $S_1 := \sum_{i=1}^d n_i$  and  $S_{-1} := \sum_{i=1}^d n_i^{-1}$ ,*

$$(1) \quad \mathcal{C}(v) = \frac{1}{2} \left( S_{-1} v + \frac{S_1}{v} \right) - d.$$

*Proof.* Each summand expands as  $J(v/n_i) = \frac{1}{2}(v/n_i + n_i/v) - 1$ . Summing over  $i$ :

$$\mathcal{C}(v) = \frac{v}{2} \sum_i \frac{1}{n_i} + \frac{1}{2v} \sum_i n_i - d = \frac{1}{2} \left( S_{-1} v + \frac{S_1}{v} \right) - d. \quad \square$$

**Theorem 2.3** (Exact minimizer and strict convexity).  *$\mathcal{C}$  is strictly convex on  $(0, \infty)$  with unique minimizer*

$$(2) \quad v^* = \sqrt{\frac{S_1}{S_{-1}}} = \sqrt{\frac{\sum_i n_i}{\sum_i n_i^{-1}}}.$$

*Proof.* Differentiate (??):

$$\mathcal{C}'(v) = \frac{1}{2} \left( S_{-1} - \frac{S_1}{v^2} \right), \quad \mathcal{C}''(v) = \frac{S_1}{v^3} > 0.$$

Strict positivity of  $\mathcal{C}''$  gives strict convexity. Since  $\mathcal{C}(v) \rightarrow +\infty$  as  $v \rightarrow 0^+$  or  $v \rightarrow +\infty$  (from (??)),  $\mathcal{C}$  is coercive. A strictly convex coercive function has exactly one critical point, which is the global minimum. Setting  $\mathcal{C}'(v) = 0$ :  $S_{-1} = S_1/v^2 \implies v^2 = S_1/S_{-1} \implies v^* = \sqrt{S_1/S_{-1}}$ .  $\square$

**Definition 2.4** ( $J$ -mean). For positive data  $n_1, \dots, n_d$ , define the  $J$ -mean as

$$\mathbb{J}\mathbb{M}(n_1, \dots, n_d) := \sqrt{\frac{\sum_i n_i}{\sum_i n_i^{-1}}}.$$

**Corollary 2.5** (AM/HM interpretation). *With  $\text{AM} := \frac{1}{d} \sum_i n_i$  and  $\text{HM} := d / \sum_i n_i^{-1}$ ,*

$$\mathbb{J}\mathbb{M}(n_1, \dots, n_d) = \sqrt{\text{AM} \cdot \text{HM}}.$$

For  $d = 2$ :  $\mathbb{J}\mathbb{M}(n_1, n_2) = \sqrt{n_1 n_2}$  (the geometric mean).

*Proof.*  $S_1/S_{-1} = d \cdot \text{AM} \cdot \text{HM} / d = \text{AM} \cdot \text{HM}$ . For  $d = 2$ :  $(n_1 + n_2)/(n_1^{-1} + n_2^{-1}) = (n_1 + n_2) \cdot n_1 n_2 / (n_1 + n_2) = n_1 n_2$ .  $\square$

*Remark 2.6* (Relation to other means). The  $J$ -mean satisfies  $\text{HM} \leq \mathbb{J}\mathbb{M} \leq \text{AM}$  by the AM-HM inequality, with equality throughout iff all  $n_i$  are equal. It coincides with the geometric mean for  $d = 2$  but differs for  $d \geq 3$  (for instance,  $\mathbb{J}\mathbb{M}(1, 1, 4) = \sqrt{6/(1+1+1/4)} = \sqrt{6/(9/4)} = \sqrt{8/3} \approx 1.633$ , while  $\text{GM}(1, 1, 4) = 4^{1/3} \approx 1.587$ ). See Bullen [?] for a comprehensive discussion of mean inequalities.

**Proposition 2.7** (Exact minimum value).

$$\min_{v>0} \mathcal{C}(v) = \sqrt{S_1 S_{-1}} - d \geq 0.$$

*Equality holds iff  $n_1 = \dots = n_d$ .*

*Proof.* Evaluate (??) at  $v^* = \sqrt{S_1/S_{-1}}$ :

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{C}(v^*) &= \frac{1}{2} \left( S_{-1} \sqrt{S_1/S_{-1}} + \frac{S_1}{\sqrt{S_1/S_{-1}}} \right) - d \\ &= \frac{1}{2} (\sqrt{S_1 S_{-1}} + \sqrt{S_1 S_{-1}}) - d = \sqrt{S_1 S_{-1}} - d. \end{aligned}$$

By the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality in  $\mathbb{R}^d$  (applied to the vectors  $(n_1^{1/2}, \dots, n_d^{1/2})$  and  $(n_1^{-1/2}, \dots, n_d^{-1/2})$ ):

$$S_1 S_{-1} = \left( \sum_i n_i \right) \left( \sum_i n_i^{-1} \right) \geq \left( \sum_i 1 \right)^2 = d^2.$$

Hence  $\sqrt{S_1 S_{-1}} \geq d$ , giving  $\mathcal{C}(v^*) \geq 0$ . Equality in Cauchy–Schwarz occurs iff  $n_i^{1/2}$  and  $n_i^{-1/2}$  are proportional for all  $i$ , i.e. iff all  $n_i$  are equal.  $\square$

**Example 2.8.** For  $d = 3$ ,  $n_1 = 1$ ,  $n_2 = 2$ ,  $n_3 = 8$ :  $S_1 = 11$ ,  $S_{-1} = 1 + 1/2 + 1/8 = 13/8$ ,  $v^* = \sqrt{88/13} \approx 2.602$ ,  $\min \mathcal{C} = \sqrt{143/8} - 3 \approx 1.227$ .

### 3. STRICT FRUSTRATION INEQUALITIES

The central message of this section: when neighbor data disagree, no choice of  $v$  can bring the total bond cost to zero.

**Theorem 3.1** (No simultaneous annihilation). *If  $n_1, n_2 > 0$  and  $n_1 \neq n_2$ , there is no  $v > 0$  with  $J(v/n_1) = J(v/n_2) = 0$ .*

*Proof.* By [?, Corollary 2.5],  $J(v/n_i) = 0 \iff v = n_i$ . Simultaneous vanishing forces  $v = n_1$  and  $v = n_2$ , contradicting  $n_1 \neq n_2$ .  $\square$

**Corollary 3.2** (Strict two-bond frustration). *If  $n_1 \neq n_2$  ( $n_1, n_2 > 0$ ), then for every  $v > 0$ :  $J(v/n_1) + J(v/n_2) > 0$ .*

*Proof.* Each summand is  $\geq 0$  (since  $J \geq 0$ ). If the sum were zero, both summands would vanish, contradicting Theorem ???.  $\square$

**Proposition 3.3** (Exact two-neighbor residual). *For  $n_1, n_2 > 0$ :*

$$(3) \quad \min_{v>0} (J(v/n_1) + J(v/n_2)) = \sqrt{\frac{n_1}{n_2}} + \sqrt{\frac{n_2}{n_1}} - 2.$$

*If  $n_1 \neq n_2$ , this minimum is strictly positive.*

*Proof.* By Corollary ??, the minimizer is  $v^* = \sqrt{n_1 n_2}$ . Set  $r := \sqrt{n_2/n_1}$ , so  $v^*/n_1 = r$  and  $v^*/n_2 = 1/r$ . Then:

$$\begin{aligned} J(r) + J(1/r) &= \frac{1}{2}(r + r^{-1}) - 1 + \frac{1}{2}(r^{-1} + r) - 1 \\ &= (r + r^{-1}) - 2 \\ &= \sqrt{\frac{n_2}{n_1}} + \sqrt{\frac{n_1}{n_2}} - 2. \end{aligned}$$

By the AM-GM inequality,  $r + r^{-1} \geq 2\sqrt{r \cdot r^{-1}} = 2$ , with equality iff  $r = 1$  (i.e.  $n_1 = n_2$ ).  $\square$

**Corollary 3.4** ( $d$ -bond positivity from one incompatible pair). *Let  $n_1, \dots, n_d > 0$  with  $n_i \neq n_j$  for some pair  $i \neq j$ . Then for every  $v > 0$ :*

$$\sum_{\ell=1}^d J(v/n_\ell) > 0.$$

*Moreover,*

$$\sum_{\ell=1}^d J(v/n_\ell) \geq \sqrt{\frac{n_i}{n_j}} + \sqrt{\frac{n_j}{n_i}} - 2 > 0.$$

*Proof.* All  $d$  terms are  $\geq 0$ . Drop all except the  $(i, j)$  pair:  $\sum_{\ell} J(v/n_\ell) \geq J(v/n_i) + J(v/n_j)$ . Apply Corollary ?? for strict positivity and Proposition ??? for the explicit bound (noting that the bound holds for every  $v$ , hence also at the  $d$ -bond optimum).  $\square$

**Example 3.5.** With  $n_1 = 2$ ,  $n_2 = 8$ : residual =  $\sqrt{1/4} + \sqrt{4} - 2 = 1/2 + 2 - 2 = 1/2$ . With  $n_1 = 1$ ,  $n_2 = 100$ : residual =  $1/10 + 10 - 2 = 8.1$ . Wide disparity produces large frustration.

## 4. GRAPH-LEVEL NON-COLLAPSE

We now lift the local frustration to a global statement on graphs.

**Definition 4.1** (Prescribed neighborhood data). Let  $G = (V, E)$  be a finite connected graph. For each vertex  $u \in V$ , fix a positive multiset  $\mathcal{N}(u) = \{n_{u,1}, \dots, n_{u,d_u}\}$ . The *local  $J$ -mean* is  $m_u := \mathbb{M}(\mathcal{N}(u))$ .

**Theorem 4.2** (Distinct local means force distinct optimal states). *Suppose there exist vertices  $u, w \in V$  with  $m_u \neq m_w$ . If a field  $x = (x_v)_{v \in V}$  satisfies*

$$x_u \in \arg \min_{t > 0} \sum_{i=1}^{d_u} J(t/n_{u,i}) \quad \text{for every } u \in V,$$

*then  $x_u \neq x_w$ . In particular, no such field is spatially uniform.*

*Proof.* By Theorem ??, each local arg min is a singleton:  $\arg \min_{t > 0} \sum_i J(t/n_{u,i}) = \{m_u\}$ . Hence  $x_u = m_u$  for every  $u$ . If  $m_u \neq m_w$ , then  $x_u \neq x_w$ . A uniform field  $x_u \equiv c$  would require  $m_u = c$  for all  $u$ , contradicting  $m_u \neq m_w$ .  $\square$

*Remark 4.3* (Scope of the non-collapse statement). Theorem ?? concerns optimization against *prescribed* (externally fixed) neighborhood data. For the unconstrained edge-energy functional  $\sum_{\{u,w\} \in E} J(x_u/x_w)$ , constant fields achieve zero energy and are trivially optimal. Therefore the topological frustration mechanism requires either incompatible prescribed boundary conditions, external forcing, or additional constraint structure (such as window neutrality [?]). This distinction is important in applications.

## 5. APPLICATION INTERFACES

We record the precise forms used by companion papers.

*Remark 5.1* (Fluid-direction smoothing interface). If direction updates near the vorticity zero set  $\{\omega = 0\}$  are modeled by local reciprocal cost minimization against neighboring directions, then incompatible local neighborhoods generate strictly positive residual cost (Corollary ??), preventing collapse to a single linearized average in defect regions. See [?] for the full blow-up exclusion argument.

*Remark 5.2* (Constraint-relaxation interface). In graph encodings of combinatorial constraints, if a relaxed local state must satisfy incompatible neighboring targets, the strict residual cost of Corollary ?? forbids a zero-cost fractional survivor. See the companion paper on combinatorial feasibility for the complete reduction.

*Remark 5.3* (Lattice embedding interface). In reciprocal-cost lattice updates, distinct local prescribed neighborhoods force differentiated local optima by Theorem ??, providing a direct non-collapse criterion for gauge-field lattice embeddings.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author thanks the referees for careful reading.

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